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The shift from a fixed-exchange-rate regime to a flexible regime, in 
which central-bank exchange-market intervention has been hlghly visible,  has 
renewed interest in studying the effects of intervention.  In  separate work 
started by Engle (1982),  new techniques have been developed to analyze risk 
premia in asset returns and particularly in exchange rates.  We utilize a 
framework developed by Hodrick  (1989)  to show how central-bank intervention 
can affect both the level of exchange rates and the risk premium.  We assume 
specific foms  for preferences and for the stochastic processes of the 
exogenous variables and show how the risk premium is related to the 
conditional variances of intervention and the other exogenous processes.  This 
approach differs from previous analyses of intervention by explicitly relating 
intervention to the risk premium.  This lays the groundwork for future tests 
of the theory's implications for the intervention/ris<k  premium relati~~nship. 
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Central-bank intervention in exchange markets has increased 
markedly since 1985,  renewing interest among economists in understanding the 
effects of this activity. Although the current regime is ostensibly one in 
which rates are permitted to float,  central banks commonly intervene to 
influence the level of exchange rates as well as to reduce the rates' 
volatility.  Continued intervention is based on the belief that such actions 
indeed have the desired effect. 
A more general interest in discerning the effects of intervention 
results from the potential significance of this activity as a policy 
instrument.  If sterilized intervention  (intervention  that has no impact on 
monetary policy) can influence exchange rates,  then policymakers have a third 
instrument  (in  addition to monetary and fiscal policy) with which to achieve 
their targets. 
Determining the effectiveness of intervention also has implications 
for other policies.  If bonds that differ only in currency denomination are 
perfect substitutes for one another,  then intervention may be ineffective. 
However,  this may imply that fiscal policy would be ineffective in a small, 
open economy with floating exchange rates  (Siebert  [1989]). 
Intervention may influence the risk premium in exchange rates as well 
as the level of exchange rates.  Although reducing exchange-rate volatility is 
a somewhat different ob  j  ective than influencing the level of exchange rates, 
intervention for this purpose may indirectly influence the level of exchange 
rates,  because changes in volatility may influence the risk premium that 
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Most recent studies of exchange-rate determination give the risk 
premium a prominent role.  This can be traced partly to the failure of earlier 
theories that did not explicitly consider risk.  The presence of a risk 
premium can explain a divergence of the rates of return between domestic and 
foreign assets, measured in the same currency  (that  is,  a violation of 
uncovered interest parity). 
As a result of such findings,  we now have theories to explain how such 
a risk premium could arise.  In addition, largely as a result of the work of 
Engle  (for  example [1982]),  new techniques are now available to analyze time 
variation in conditional variances. Conditional variances may be closely tied 
to perceptions of future volatility and,  thus,  risk. 
11.  Channels of Influence in Central-Bank Intervention 
To understand the mechanics of a typical spot-market intervention, 
consider a transaction designed to offset a dollar depreciation.  In this 
case, the Federal Reserve would purchase dollars for marks on the spot 
market from a commercial bank.  This would typically give the Federal Reserve 
two business days for delivery of marks.  To finance the transaction, the 
Federal Reserve would sell mark securities held in accounts with the 
Bundesbank.  The Bundesbank would act as the agent for the Federal Resenre, 
establishing an account for the U.S. central bank with the proceeds of the 
security transactions.  The Federal Reserve would then settle the spot 
transaction  with the commercial bank by drawing on its account with the 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm
Best available copyBundesbank.  The net effect is to decrease U.S. reserves and the monetary 
base. 
Then, in order to sterilize the intervention  (that  is,  offset its impact 
on reserves),  the Federal Reserve may sell the equivalent amount of U.S. 
government securities,  leaving as the only net effect of the two transactions 
a change in the Federal Reserve's and the private sector's  portfolios of 
domestic and foreign assets.  If the initial transaction is not sterilized, 
then it is equivalent to an open market operation.  Since the impact of open 
market operations is presumably better understood than the impact of 
intervention,  most studies of intervention focus on sterilized interventions. 
Sterilized intervention  could matter if the currency composition of 
debt influenced the exchange rate.  In the portfolio-balance approach, 
exchange rates are determined by expected nominal rates of return on debt of 
different currency denominations.  If investors care about portfolio risk and 
expected rates of return, and if bonds of different denominations are 
imperfect substitutes,  then shifts in asset supplies will alter portfolio risk 
and induce changes in  rates of return and in the exchange rate.  This was the 
predominant approach to analyzing the effects of intervention in the 1970s. 
Even if foreign and domestic assets are imperfect substitutes, 
intervention may not matter under Ricardian equivalence  (see  Obstfeld [1982]). 
In that case,  agents do not regard the government bond holdings as part of net 
wealth,  and fully capitalize future tax effects,  neutralizing the impact of 
intervention.  Backus and Kehoe  (1988)  emphasize the key role played by the 
government budget constraint in analyses of intervention.  If other government 
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structure of the economy and on the exact nature of the policy change. 
However,  under Ricardian equivalence, exchange rates are unaffected by 
intervention if lump-sum taxes are levied on the representative consumer. 
Another channel through which intervention may matter is its effect on 
expectations of economic conditions or policies.  In particular,  intervention 
may provide a credible signal of changes in future monetary and/or  fiscal 
policies.  Exactly why intervention would be chosen as the signal is unclear. 
However,  once the central bank has intervened,  it may stand to lose money by 
not following through on the expected policy. For example, if the U.S. central 
bank purchases dollar-denominated bonds and sells foreign currency bonds to 
signal its intention to allow the price of dollars to rise, it has an 
incentive to increase the price of dollars and thus the value of its holdings. 
Recent research analyzing other possible incentive effects of central-bank 
intervention is sumnarized  by Obstfeld (1989a). 
111. Does Intervention  Matter? 
Most empirical studies conclude that intervention does not influence 
exchange rates.  Many of these studies indirectly examine the influence of 
intervention by testing the hypothesis of perfect substitutability  of bonds 
that differ in currency denomination.  The usual technique is to regress 
either exchange rates or the difference between the rates of return on foreign 
and domestic bonds  (the  covered-interest  parity condition) on measures such as 
relative supplies of debt denominated in different currencies.  Numerous 
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supplies as explanatory variables and find evidence against imperfect 
substitutability.  On the other hand,  Danker et al. (1985),  Loopesko (1984), 
and Johnson  (1988)  find evidence for imperfect substitutability.  However, 
little of the variation in the dependent variable can be explained by relative 
debt supplies.  This,  in turn,  implies that intervention is not likely to have 
much impact, since it is small relative to the debt aggregates. 
The previous discussion of the role of the government budget 
constraint and the tenuous link between perfect substitutability and the 
effects of intervention should make us cautious in interpreting these results. 
Without having specified and controlled for possible effects operating through 
the budget constraint, these empirical studies may be misspecified. 
Recent investigations have implied a role for intervention as a 
signal. Domingues  (1988)  finds that U.S. intervention has played a role in 
signaling changes in monetary policy,  but that the effectiveness of 
intervention depends on the credibility of the monetary policy.  When actual 
and announced monetary policies are inconsistent,  intervention may be used to 
send a false signal to the market.  Thus,  intervention should be considered 
part of overall monetary policy.  Humpage  (1988)  finds that intervention has 
an initial, one-time impact if it is supported by consistent statements of 
changes in monetary and fiscal policy and by coordinated action of central 
banks. 
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systematically reduced short-run exchange-rate  fluctuations  (Pippenger  and 
Phillips [1973]).  However, this conclusion is disputed by Sweeney  (1981). 
IV. Risk in Exchange Rates 
Evidence 
A wide variety of evidence suggests that there is a risk premium 
component to exchange rates  (see  Hodrick [1987]).  Violation of the uncovered- 
interest parity condition  (expected  profits to forward speculation  should be 
zero) and the poor out-of-sample  predictive performance of log-linear 
exchange-rate models relying on first moments suggest a risk premium. 
However,  evidence of a risk premium has been synonymous with the failure of 
previous theories of exchange-rate determination.  Not all investigators are 
convinced that a risk premium exists  (for  example, Froot and Frankel [1989]). 
Expectational errors may explain the above anomalies.  Tests of the parity 
condition involve the joint hypothesis of market efficiency,  perfect 
substitution,  and capital mobility.  Such considerations further complicate 
interpretation of the results. 
Many empirical investigations into the risk premium in 
foreign-exchange rates model risk with time variation in conditional variance 
using Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity  (ARCH).  Useful 
discussions of this literature are found in Hodrick  (1987)  and Frankel  (1989). 
Pagan and Hong  (1988)  and Nelson  (1987)  question the appropriateness of the 
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variances implied by options-pricing formulas and find time variation in 
"risk."  However, the significance of the magnitude and time variation in the 
risk premium is unclear. 
Theory 
Exchange rates have been at various times viewed as the relative 
prices of currencies, the relative prices of domestic versus foreign goods, 
and the relative price of assets denominated in different currencies. 
However,  as Dornbusch  (1985)  states,  "...it becomes readily apparent that in 
most instances real, monetary,  and financial considerations interact in the 
determination of exchange rates." 
In models of the risk premium that incorporate optimization and 
equilibrium behavior under uncertainty,  the risk premium will depend on the 
risk preferences of the consumers,  on other parameters of the model,  and on 
- 
the stochastic properties of exogenous variables such as money.  Lucas  (1982) 
and Siebert  (1989)  present contrasting theoretical approaches to the 
determination  of exchange rates in general equilibrium under uncertainty. 
Tests of theoretical models of the risk premium are growing in number. 
In international capital asset pricing models of mean-variance optimizing 
consumers,  time variation in risk should be related to time variation in the 
covariance matrix of asset returns.  Examples of this approach are Engel and 
Rodrigues (1987), Giovannini and Jorion (1989), and Mark  (1988).  Hodrick 
(1989),  Cumby (1988), and Obstfeld (1989b) test consumption-based asset 
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stochastic processes of the exogenous variables, including money.  Both 
approaches have had limited success in explaining risk premia. 
The role of intervention in explaining foreign exchange risk is 
largely unexplored.  One reason may be that early investigations focused on 
the ability of debt variables to explain the deviation from interest-rate 
parity,  with that deviation  being a measure of risk.  However,  there is 
evidence that the volatility of exchange rates has varied across monetary 
policy regimes  (Lastrapes  [1989]) and that the impact of intervention is 
related to monetary policy  (Domingues  [I9881 and Humpage [1988]). 
V. The Model 
The theoretical model we present provides testable hypotheses about 
the influence of intervention on the risk premium in foreign exchange rates. 
The consumption-based asset pricing model of Hodrick  (1989)  is modified for 
this task.  In his model, the risk premium in the exchange rate is a function 
of the conditional variances of money, government's share in production, and 
production itself.  Simplifying assumptions about preferences and about the 
stochastic properties of exogenous variables are necessary in order to derive 
closed-form solutions indicating the relations among the exchange rate,  the 
risk premium,  and the first and second moments of the exogenous pr0cesses.l 
Without such assumptions, it is difficult to say much about the likely impacts 
of intervention on the risk premi~m.~ 
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Hodrick's model, consumers and governments each face cash-in-advance  (CIA) 
constraints, and the total stock of each currency is split between private and 
governmental holdings.  We model intervention in terms of governments' holding 
of foreign currencies.  Intervention is actually variation in the stock held, 
influencing the amount of currency available for private or government 
consumption.  In  Hodrick's model,  the variability, as well as the level,  of 
private money influences exchange rates and the risk premium.  Thus, in our 
model,  the level,  as well as the variability,  of intervention influences the 
rate and its risk premium.  In effect,  knowledge of the stochastic process 
describing intervention improves the ability of monetary aggregates to predict 
exchange rates. 
Endowments and Timing 
Two countries, indicated with subscripts 1 and 2,  each produce one 
good,  which is also the endowment of each country.  The realizations of the 
two exogenous, nonstorable goods are denoted Y1, and Yzt. We assume that 
the goods markets are open at the start of the period and that asset markets 
are open at the end.  It is convenient to think of each household as comprised 
of two agents,  one that takes the accumulated cash out for shopping,  and 
another that subsequently enters the asset market to purchase cash,  bonds,  and 
equities. 
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available at the start of the period.  The government and the private shopper 
enter the goods market with available cash balances.  The government's  cash 
balance can be augmented through new currency issue and is also influenced by 
intervention.  Any remaining cash balances,  in addition to the gross returns 
on bonds and stocks,  become available to the consumer for the subsequent asset 
markets.  Lump-sum taxes or transfers are also levied in the second half of 
the period. 
Government 
Each government purchases some of the endowment of its own country, 
collects lump-sum taxes,  supplies state-contingent claims to its own currency, 
prints its own currency, and intervenes in the foreign exchange market by 
purchasing some of the foreign currency.  The real q,uantity  of government ips 
purchases of good i at time t is Gi,.  Because consumers do not value 
government spending, variation in Git  affects the amount of the endowment 
available for consumption.  rib  is the lump-sum tax levied by government i 
in the asset market.  Bit+l(xt+l)  is the amount of money i that government i 
promises to pay if state x,+~  occurs.  Its currency i value at time t in state 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm
Best available copyxt  is ni  (xt+,  ,xt)  .  The gross growth rate of money i over period t  , Mit+JMit, 
is denoted nit. The outstanding amount of money i and the amount held by 
the foreign government at the end of period t-1  are denoted Mit  and M:,, 
respectively.  Nominal government purchases of endowment i in the time t goods 
market are constrained by the government's holding of currency i cash balances 
at the start of period t, q,,,  plus any additional currency i to be supplied. 
In Hodrick (1989),  the additional amount represents the amount printed 
by government i and supplied in the asset market.  Here,  however,  governments 
purchase foreign currency and do not spend it.  So,  the additional amount of 
currency i to be made available is the amount printed net of the increase in 
foreign holdings of the currency.  This CIA constraint can be expressed as 
The holdings of the foreign currency have no effect other than to reduce the 
amount of currency available to purchase foreign goods.  For simplicity,  we 
ignore any effect of govemment earnings on foreign reserves. 
Expression  (2)  is the government budget constraint. 
J ni(xt+l,xt)Bit+l(xt+l)  &t+1  -  Bit(xt)  +  ('it+,  -  Mit) 
(2)  'it  = 'it  +  ,  i=1,2, 
Pit  Pit 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm
Best available copy12 
where Pit  is price in currency i of the good/endowment of country i. 
Agents' Preferences and Constraints 
Following Hodrick (1989), we assume that all agents' preferences are 
homothetic and, thus,  that there is a representative consumer in each country. 
Preferences and initial wealth levels of the two consumers are assumed to be 
identical and each consumer is taxed equally by the two countries.  Each 
representative consumer maximizes expected lifetime utility as in 
by choosing C1, and C2,  and by making her savings decisions. 
The consumer in each country faces two constraints: a CIA constraint 
and a budget constraint.  The CIA constraint,  expressed in real terms,  shows 
that purchases of good i are constrained to be no greater than the amount of 
currency i held by the consumer when she enters the goods market: 
(4) cl, 5  ~~,,n,,, 
(5)  @,C,,  5  M~~~$~. 
Here IIlt = l/P1, is the good one purchasing power of currency one,  and I12t =  St/Pl, 
is the good one purchasing power of currency two.  St  is the exchange rate 
of currency one per unit of currency two,  and 8,  =  StP2,/P1,  is a "real terms of 
trade," although goods cannot be exchanged directly in the model.  Note also 
that monies cannot be exchanged directly in the goods markets. 
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she enters the asset market,  after having made her consumption choices, net of 
taxes.  Wealth includes unspent monies,  realizations on previous purchases of 
state-contingent bonds,  and realizations on equity shares.  Agents in each 
country can buy and trade titles to the endowments of each country.  The 
number of titles to the endowment of country i purchased in the asset market 
at time t is denoted Zit+1.  The associated currency one price is denoted Qit. 
For convenience,  we assume that there is just one share of the endowment for 
each country.  The period t budget constraint,  identical to Hodrick  (1989) ,  is 
reproduced here: 
(6)  nlt~~lt+l  +  %t%t+l  + ~1Sn1  (xt+1,  xt)Btlt+, (xt+,)dxt+,  + ~~2J%~(~t+l  '~t)%t+l  (~t+l)  %+l 
+ $ltZ1t+l  + +ztZzt+l "  (nlt~tlt-cl,)  +  (%t%t  -  @tCzt)  + ~~lt~:t(xt)  +nzt~~2t(xt) 
+  ($lt+Y1t)Z1t  +  (+2t*tY2t)Z2t  -  (1/2) (rltMtrzt)  , where $it '  Qit/Plt. 
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The agent chooses consumption of both goods,  holdings of both 
currencies,  state-contingent claims to both currencies,  and titles to both 
endowments.  The future states of the world are uncertain to the consumers, 
but there is a known,  first-order Markov density, F(X,+~~X,),  between the 
states of the world at times t and t+l.  Utility maximization is subject to 
the wealth constraint and the two CIA constraints.  The optimality conditions, 
listed in appendix A,  are identical to those in Hodrick  (1989). 
The marginal utility of consumption is not necessarily equated to the 
t 
marginal value of wealth unless the CIA constraint is assumed binding.  The 
choice of money holding will equate the current real value of wealth to the 
expected marginal utility of money in the next period,  which will depend on 
the marginal values of wealth and money then.  The Euler equations for the 
nonmoney assets differ from those for money,  since bonds and stocks provide no 
return until consumption in the next period has occurred. 
Equilibrium 
The definition of the equilibrium is identical to Hodrick but for the 
inclusion of intervention as an additional exogenous process.  The equilibrium 
is defined as the initial stocks of monies and bonds (Mio,Bio,  i=1,2), the 
stochasic processes for the exogenous variables (Yit  ,Git  ,  T~~  'it+l 
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t=O to a), the prices (llit,8,,$,,,i=l,2,t=O to a), and the pricing functions 
ni(x,+l,x,),  i=1,2  such that 1)  budget constraints are satisfied,  2)  the 
household's decisions solve the maximization problem,  and 3)  the following 
market-clearing conditions are satisfied: 
(7b) Bit+,(xt+,)  =  ~B~,+,(x~+,),  i =  1'2, 
(7c) 2Ci, + G,,  = Y,,,  i = 1,2,  and 
(7d) Mi,+,  = M:,+,  +  +   MY,,,, i=1,2. 
Closed-Form Solutions 
In order to show explicitly how intervention  can influence the 
exchange rate and the risk premium in the exchange rate,  we assume particular 
stochastic processes for the exogenous variables.  We follow Hodrick regarding 
the assumed processes,  noting the key role played by assumptions about the 
stochastic independence of exogenous variables.  Hodrick examines variation in 
government's share of output as an independent exogenous variable.  Government 
expenditures influence the amount of output available for consumption. 
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output,  which, given the assumptions of the theory,  just equals one minus the 
government's share.5  Lower-case letters denote logarithms,  and wit+,  denotes 
the logarithm of the gross growth rate of currency i  ,  nit+l=Mit+2/Mit+l.  We assume 
conditional log-normality for outputs and gross money-growth rates.  we 
define the proportion of currency i held by the foreign government by 
F  rit  = Mit/Mit  and assume that the rits  and the consumption shares x 
it 
(defined  as [Yit  -Git]  pit)  are conditionally uniform in distribution. 
Formally,  these assumptions are 
(8a)  Ylt+l = Ply,,  +  (~-P,)Y,  +  El,+,, 
(8b)  yzt+,  = p2yzt  +  (~-P,)Y~  +  Jzt+,, 
(8~)  wit+, = P3Wlt  +  (1-P3)w1  + J3t+l, 
(8d)  w,,+,  = P4WZt  +  (1-p4)w2  +  +4t+l' 
-  (8e)  XI,+,  - P5Xlt  +  ('-P,)X,  + <5t+l' 
(8f)  Xzt+, - PBXzt  +  (1-pc,)x2  +  <6t+l, 
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(8h)  C2t+l = p8Czt +  ('-p8)C2  + 
where 0  s lpil  s  I,  i-1 to 8,  and each <it+l,  i-1 to 4  is normally distributed 
with conditional mean equal to zero and conditional variance denoted hit. 
However,  each fit+l,  i=5 to 8 is distributed uniformly on the interval [-hit  ,hit] 
with conditional mean of zero but conditional variance given by (hit12/3.  We 
also assume that the fit+ls  are independent of each other.  The conditional 
variances are described by the following autoregressive processes: 
(9)  Et(hit+l)  = dihit  +  (1-di)hi,  i=1,2,3,4. 
Here the term on the left-hand side is just E~[E~+~(~~,:)],  and the his  are 
the unconditional variances. The conditional and unconditional variances of 
both the foreign money shares and the consumption shares are denoted (hit)'/3 
and (hi)'/3,  respectively.  The state of the economy, xt,  is defined as 
(yit  ,mit+l  ,wit,  xit,  Cit+l,  rit  ,hjt,  i=l,  2,  j=l,  8,  t=O to -1,  and the rit and 
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As in Hodrick (1989), we assume the following utility function: 
(10)  U(Clt  ,Czt)  =  [l/(l-7) 1~i-T  +  [l/(l-6) ]~f-t. 
Here we have assumed constant relative risk aversion.  The magnitude of the 
parameter of risk aversion  (which  is also equal to the parameter expressing 
intertemporal substitution) will influence the response of prices such as the 
exchange rate to shocks from processes such as intervention. 
In addition,  we assume that the CIA constraints hold with equality, 
implying constant unitary velocity of money.'  However,  Hodrick, 
Kocherlakota,  and Lucas  (1989)  indicate that relaxing the constraint is not 
likely to alter velocity greatly.  When combined with market clearing, the 
binding constraints imply the following key relations: 
(11) n,,  = Yit/[M1t+l(l-r,t+,)  I  9 
(12)  n,,  = ~,Y2,/[~,+,(~-r,,+,~1. 
Here,  since endowments must be consumed,  changes in end-of-period-t 
foreign holdings of currency one impact the price of good one in that period 
by reducing money available for purchases,  given the total available,  MI,+,. 
Although set in the goods market before the money is injected,  the goods price 
is influenced by intervention,  since the government's purchases indicate the 
amount of money  (net  of the amount absorbed by the foreign government) that 
the government must inject into the asset market. 
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expressed as 
Use of the optimality conditions yields the general form of St: 
Assuming that money  (net  of intervention) is independent of the growth 
rate of money  (net  of intervention) and the other variables in  (14)  yields 
expression  (15)  for the natural logarithm of the exchange rate 
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in rlt+, depreciate currency one (St is the currency one price of currency two). 
Either way,  the purchasing power of currency one falls.  The effect of a 
higher endowment of good one depends on the parameter 7,  which indicates 
intertemporal substitutability.  An increase in the endowment of good one will 
increase the value of currency one,  since cash must be accumulated in advance 
of purchases.  An increase in the expected foreign holdings of currency one in 
the next period will reduce the amount expected to be available for purchases, 
increase its future expected value,  and thus induce increased demand now, 
leading to appreciation of currency one. 
To arrive at an expression  for the logarithm of the exchange rate in 
terms of observable variables and conditional variances,  we utilize the 
distributions of the exogenous processes and assume that the Mit+ls  and the 
rit+l  s are independent and known at time t.& In addition,  we replace 
ln(1-c.  .) by its first-order approximation, -cit+j,  to yield expression  (16)  .9 
lt+~ 
The theoretical values of the coefficients in  (16)  are given in appendix B. 
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Here we define El,  as ln(  Et  [x~~+~-~]  )  and Zzt  as ln(Et [x,~+,-~]  ) . 
In expression  (16)  there are multiple channels through which current 
monetary conditions influence the exchange rate.  An increase in either money 
supply (Mit+l)  directly affects st  and provides information about future 
money,  since the logs of the gross growth rates of money are autocorrelated. 
An increase in the conditional variance of the endowment for good one, (hit), 
will increase the value of currency one to the extent that consumers are 
risk-averse.  An  increase in the conditional variance of the growth rate of 
currency one causes it to appreciate,  since the conditional variance 
influences expectations of future purchasing power.  The intervention 
variables, rit+l,  do not have the one-for-one influence of the money stock, 
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Best available copybecause they also impact the expected growth rates of money available for 
purchases.  Conditional variance in intervention  helps predict variability in 
the purchasing power of money,  since the endowment must be consumed in 
equilibrium. 
Intervention and the Risk Premium in the Exchange Rate 
An expression for the risk premium can be developed from the 
interest-rate parity condition,  expressed in equation  (17).  Arbitrage implies 
equality between the rates of return on investing currency one in bonds of 
country one,  then converting to currency two and investing in country one 
bonds,  and then selling the proceeds forward. 
Ft  is the forward price at time t of delivery and payment in time t+l.  A 
commonly studied expression for the risk premium is Et(st+l)-ft,  which  (17) 
implies is equal to E,(S,+~-S,)  - (ilt-izt)  .  lo  Expression (18),  derived 
from the optimality conditions,  yields the interest rate in country one: 
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and endowment processes and taking logarithms of both sides,  we can derive 
expression  (19). 
Utilizing the assumed stochastic processes of the exogenous variables, 
we arrive at expression (20)  for the interest rate in country one.  The 
theoretical values of the coefficients are presented in appendix B. 
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+ ailshlt  + ai16h3t  + ai17(Clt+l-Cl)  + ~ile(h7~)  - 
An increase in y  increases the interest rate in country one if p  It  1 
and y are between 0  and 1.  The increased demand for money will increase 
the current purchasing power of money.  However,  the endowment will return 
toward its unconditional mean,  and the purchasing power of money will fall in 
the next period.  This increase in expected inflation increases ilt.  However, 
the increase in current consumption decreases current marginal utility and 
leads to intertemporal substitution,  which may amplify or reduce this effect. 
An above-average  money growth rate will be followed by another increase in the 
money supply  (although  a smaller increase in the growth rate) and thus an 
increase in expected inflation.  An increase in intervention in currency one 
(increased  foreign holding of that currency) increases the purchasing power of 
the remaining currency one,  but will be followed by a decrease in purchasing 
power as,  in the next period, Clt+, declines towards its average. Unless 
swamped by intertemporal substitution, an increase in the conditional variance 
of good one increases ilt. Risk-averse  consumers would desire to hold 
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power of currency one rises but is anticipated to fall in the next period. 
Increased variance of the intervention in currency one increases the interest 
rate because it implies that the purchasing power of that currency is likely 
to fall. 
Utilizing the analogous expression for iZt  and an updated version of 
st+l,  we derive the expression  (21)  for the risk premium.  The theoretical values 
of the coefficients are found in appendix B. 
21)  tt+l-ft  =  arlhl,  -  ar2h2t + ar3h3t -  ar4h4t 
-  ar+~lt+27  + ar6(~t'2t+l-1n[Et(~2t+226)  1 ) 
+ ar7 (h7t+1)2  -  ar8 (h8t+1)2  ' 
If the conditional variances of both endowments increase by the same 
amount,  the risk premium is unaffected if  pl = p2.  Analogous statements 
can  be made for the conditional variances of money-growth rates.  The extent 
to which equal changes in conditional variances offset one another depends on 
the extent to which such changes are expected to be propagated into the 
future.  Increasing the conditional variance of foreign holdings of currency 
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two.  Increasing the other conditional variance has the opposite effect. 
However, if the conditional variances of both intervention variables increase 
and are propagated equally into the future,  there is no effect on the risk 
premium.  Expression  (21)  makes clear the need to distinguish between the 
variation in total money supplies and the components. 
VI. Conclusion 
In this paper we have modified a model developed by Hodrick  (1989)  to 
show how intervention can influence the foreign-exchange risk premium.  Unlike 
previous studies of intervention,  we specify the mechanism through which 
intervention should impact the risk premium in exchange rates. While previous 
studies of intervention  have analyzed sterilized intervention,  here we model 
intervention as changes in foreign governments' holdings of domestic currency. 
The proportion of currency held by the foreign government as well as the 
conditional variance of that proportion can influence the level of the 
exchange rate.  The risk premium is shown to be a function of the conditional 
variance of the intervention variable as well as the conditional variances of 
the other exogenous variables,  including the total money supplies.  Future 
work will test the theory's implications for the intervention/risk premium 
relationship. 
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1. See Siebert  (1989)  for an example of an analysis of the determinants of 
the risk premium that avoids parameterization  of preferences and distributions 
of the exogenous variables  . 
2. Of course,  the assumptions may be inappropriate for the application at 
hand.  Pagan and Hong  (1988)  discuss problems with the ARCH formulation as 
employed by Hodrick  (1989).  Cumby  (1988)  cites the assumption of 
time-separability as a possible explanation of the failure of one particular 
version of the consumption-based  asset pricing model to explain risk premia in 
forward speculation. 
3. Here we do not assume sterilization. Leahy  (1989)  discusses the 
significance of earnings on foreign reserves,  indicating that such earnings 
are not large enough to have much of an impact.  In any case,  the effects of 
the disposition of such earnings involve issues similar to those raised 
regarding the impact of portfolio balance effects. 
4.  See Stockman  and Svensson (1987), p. 183 for the solution of a similar 
model when currencies can be exchanged directly in the "goods" market. 
5.  Of course,  one can argue that these shares are not independent of 
overall output. However, it may be of interest to follow other empirical work 
and to examine the relation between variation in consumption  and exchange 
rates  (for  example, Cumby [I9881  ) . 
6. Pagan and Hong  (1988)  claim that assuming linearity in the conditional 
mean exaggerates the true volatility in such series.  They claim that 
nonparametric estimation of the conditional mean and conditional variance 
implies different results. Diebold and Nason  (1989)  argue that it is unlikely 
that out-of-sample  predictive performance for exchange rates will be improved 
by taking advantage of nonlinearities in conditional means. 
7. See Stockman and Svensson (1987),  p. 175 for a discussion of how 
assumptions about the timing of information alters this result in related 
models. 
8.  The assumption that both the Mit+ls  and the  are known at the 
start of period t is unnecessary to yield a closed-form solution.  A binding 
CIA constraint implies only that Mi,+l(l-(it+l)  is known  at the start of the period. 
However,  agents would presumably make use of their knowledge of this net 
amount in forming their expectations of money variables dated t+2. 
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Best available copy9.  Although the approximation error involved here may be "small" it may 
have a large effect on the estimates of conditional variances. Together with 
footnotes 6 and 8,  this highlights the crucial role that must be played by 
parameterization of the expectational terms in expression  (15). 
10.  Derivation of a similar expression for the risk premium, Et(St+l)-Ft, 
is discussed in Hodrick (1987), pp. 13-15. 
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The first-order conditions for the agents' problem flow from the value 
function 
(Al) V(W,  ,II1,M;,,  II,,M;,  ,x,)  = max (  U(C1,,  Czt, 
+ BS(wt+l ?nit+l~;t+~  9nzt+i%t+i  ,~t+i)F(xt+l  I xt  )%+1  9 
where wealth,  W,,  is defined as 
(A21 W,  =  ~,,M'I,  + n,,~;,  + nl,~;,(x,)  + n,,~;,(x,)  +  (Ill,+Y1,)Zl, +  (~,,+BtYzt)Zzt. 
Maximization is with respect to private consumption and choices of 
money holdings and holdings of bonds and equities. The actual transition 
probability is assumed to be known.  If A,  is the multiplier for the 
period-t budget constraint facing the consumer, ult  is the multiplier for 
the period-t currency one CIA constraint,  and v,,  is the multiplier 
for the currency two CIA constraint,  then the first-order conditions are 
described by  (A3)  through  (A10)  : 
(A31 U1, =  At + vlt, 
(A41 u,,  = 0,  + ~,,)9,, 
(A51 XtIIlt = BE, [ (A,+1  + v1,+1)n1,+,  I  9 
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(A7)  A,$,,  =  BE,  + Y1,+,)  I ' 
(A81  = BE, [ ($2t+l  +  et+ly2t+l)Xt+ll ' 
(A9)  X,nl,nl  (x,+,  9 x,)  = Bx,+lnl,+lF(x,+ll  x,) ,  v  X,+l, 
X,II~,~,(X~+~  9 x,)  =  PX,+ln,,+lF(x,+,  ix,)  9  v  X,+l. 
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The  theoretical values of  the coefficients in expression  (16)  are 
a~~ =  (1-pa)C2 -  (l-p7)C1 +  (1-6)(1-~2)~2  -  (I-7)  (l-p7)y1 + (l-p3Iwl -  (1-~4)w29 
- 
aSl - as2  .=  aS3  = as4 = 1, 
a,,  = (1-7h1, 
ass  =  (1-6)~~' 
- 
as7  -P39 
= Pq  9 
ass  =  (1-~>~/2, 
aslo  =  (1-612/2, 
-  asll - Q,12  = 1/29 
- 
as13  - p7' 
as14  Pa' 
aSlS  = aSl6  = 1/6. 
The  theoretical values of  the coefficients for expression  (20)  are 
ail, = -1nS + wl  -  -~~-d~/  -  (l-d3)h3/2 -  P~(~-P,){~  -  (1-d7)(h713/6, 
aill = Pi12  =  19 
ails = -  (1-7)P1  (~~-1)  9 
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2  2  arl =  (1-7)  PI  /2, 
2  2  ar2  =  (1-7)  P2  /2, 
Qr3  =.  (1+~~~)  /2, 
a*,, =  (1+~~~)/2, 
~,5  = %e  = 1  , ar7  = p7/6, 
Pr, =  pg/6  - 
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